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Rosalind Hursthouse (*1943) is known chiefly both for her groundbreaking work in applying 
virtue ethics to practical matters and for her 1999 monograph On Virtue Ethics, which 
represents one of the first and few systematic treatments of modern virtue ethics and, in its 
central doctrines, remains highly influential to this day.1 The third and final part of this book 
is devoted to what is now known as neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, which in 
Hursthouse’s own words generally consists in “the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on 
considerations of human nature” (192). On her account, this project specifically aims at 
rendering the rationality of virtuous action intelligible by situating it in the wider context of 
human life. 
 Hursthouse goes about this task by first diagnosing a close connection between virtue 
and practical reasoning.2 On her view, virtuous action does not merely consist in performing 
the right kinds of action but also in acting on the right reasons. For each virtue, there is a 
cluster of reasons characteristic of it. We can, to name just a few examples, distinguish 
between reasons of justice (‘I promised her.’, ‘It belongs to him.’), reasons of compassion 
(‘He is going through a difficult time.’, ‘You need this more than I do.’), reasons of gratitude 
(‘Without her, I would not have been able to do it.’), and reasons of temperance (‘I still have 
to drive.’, ‘We won't have anything for tomorrow otherwise.’). Essentially, possession of a 
virtue consists in having a stable disposition to respond to such considerations with the 
appropriate course of action, i.e. to treat them as good reasons to act in relevant ways. (121-
131) Thus, any attempt at rendering the rationality of virtuous action intelligible must answer 
the question why it is rational to follow these reasons specifically and not others, or to it put 
differently, why the virtuous are objectively right in treating the reasons of virtue as good 
reasons.  
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references are to Hursthouse (1999). Another comparably systematic development 
of modern virtue ethics, which appeared around the same time, is Müller (1998). For some of Hursthouse's 
important contributions to applied ethics, cf. Hursthouse (1987; 1991; 1995; 2000; 2006; 2009; 2011). 
2 Throughout this paper, I will use ‘practical thought’ and ‘ethical thought’ more or less interchangeably to refer 
to thought about what ought to be done. 
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 Essentially, Hursthouse believes that acting on these reasons is rational because it is 
the overall most reliable way for us to attain our flourishing or eudaimonia, even if it does not 
perfectly guarantee it. (167-177) On her view, this connection between virtue and flourishing 
is established by certain beliefs and convictions about how human life generally works and 
what matters in it, which entail an understanding of what counts as a good reason for what. 
Thus, she maintains that the reasons of honesty, for instance, are good reasons because, 
among other things, lies destroy trust and without trust there can be no genuine friendship; 
because lying ultimately does not pay since others will eventually find out; because if you 
stick to the truth in the first place you will not have to monitor your own words all the time; 
and because the love of truth is a crucial precondition for science, which is an important good 
in human life. (168)  
 Hursthouse is conscious of the fact, however, that not everybody shares these 
convictions. An immoralist wishing to deny the rationality of honesty might, for instance, 
argue that, with a bit of talent and practice, it is not all too difficult to lie convincingly; that 
you can fool most people most of the time because they tend to be overly trustful; or that true 
friendship is a myth because most people only seek their own good in the end, and hence one 
ought to protect oneself with the occasional lie and should not be too forthcoming. (179, 188) 
That such differences in outlook are possible indicates that our beliefs about human life are 
fundamentally open to doubt and could, at least in theory, turn out entirely wrong, just as 
some firmly held convictions of our forebears have turned out, in retrospect, as racist, sexist, 
classist, and the like.  
 For this reason, Hursthouse assigns ethical naturalism the task of providing us with a 
framework for evaluating and, if possible, validating our beliefs about human life, which 
underwrite the goodness of our reasons. Yet, to get the character of her naturalism into view 
properly, it is important to note what, for Hursthouse, recourse to human nature does not 
consist in. For talk of human nature easily lends itself to the assumption that she must be 
pursuing a reductionist project, which re-conceives ethics in terms of an applied evolutionary 
or sociobiology in order to provide it with a natural scientific foundation.3 Hursthouse herself, 
however, explicitly rejects any scientistic naturalism of this kind. She maintains that a purely 
ethological or sociobiological account of human beings would not be rich enough in content 
                                                          
3 This misunderstanding underlies a widespread line of criticism against neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which 
seeks to demonstrate that the traditional virtues are incompatible with, and therefore cannot be grounded in, a 
purely evolutionary or biological account of human beings. Cf. Andreou (2006), Millum (2006), and Millgram 
(2009). As will become apparent by the end of this paper, a similar misunderstanding also underlies Leist’s 
(2010, 136-141) charge that Hursthouse’s ‘biological’ naturalism fails due to its alleged reliance on an outdated 
vitalistic folk biology that has been refuted by post-Darwinian scientific biology. 
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to ground all the complexities of ethical life, as we encounter them in actually leading such a 
life, i.e. from a practical and first-person point of view. Since natural scientific accounts of the 
human take an external or third-person perspective on human life, they are ethically 
underdetermined, and this underdetermination puts a scientistic moral philosophy at risk of 
deriving ethical principles in an overly simplistic manner. On Hursthouse’s view, such 
derivations ultimately act as a reductio ad absurdum of this approach, since they easily result 
in revisions to our ordinary ethical beliefs that are unacceptable on grounds of contradicting 
basic certainties of human life. (192f.; Hursthouse 2004, 264-266) 
 Clearly then, it is not Hursthouse’s intent to deduce the virtues from a substantive 
account of human nature as it presents itself from the ethically neutral vantage point of natural 
science; an account specifiable independently of our extant ethical beliefs. Instead, she 
explicitly agrees with John McDowell that any validation of the virtues can take place only 
from within the ethical outlook we have acquired in our upbringing, i.e. only in recourse to 
other ethical beliefs we have already come to accept. (165; Hursthouse 2012, 173-175) 
According to McDowell (1995), recourse to empirical findings about human life cannot 
supply such a validation because human beings are practically rational animals, and as such 
we can always decide to change the way we go about our lives. Correspondingly, Hursthouse 
emphasizes that our beliefs about how human life generally works do not capture empirical 
facts that could be discovered through natural scientific methods such as “observation or 
statistical analysis” (189). Rather, these beliefs capture a distinct kind of fact. Although 
Hursthouse has no specific name for them, we might label facts of this kind ‘ethical or 
practical facts’. 
 What defines such facts is that we originally generate them in action, and hence they 
are neither fixed nor known in the way of empirical facts. We can always decide to do things 
differently and, on the basis of reasons, change our ways of acting—and this is why nothing 
we can determine empirically or statistically about how humans in fact live has final authority 
in settling the correct account of human nature. Human beings are capable of determining 
their own way of life and consequently, to some extent, their own nature, i.e. our chosen way 
of doing things expresses our free and practical self-interpretation as human beings. Our 
beliefs about how human life generally works, which encompass our understanding of what is 
a good reason for what, have this self-interpretation as their object. On Hursthouse’s view, 
these beliefs form an essential but often overlooked part of our ethical outlook, which 
therefore does not merely include purely evaluative beliefs but also “ethical but non-
evaluative beliefs about human nature and how human life goes” (189). Hursthouse thus 
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employs a concept of human nature that is not empirical but from the outset essentially 
normative.4 
 The content of this concept of human nature is determined by our practical self-
interpretation and thus ultimately consists in our acquired ethical outlook. This is the reason 
why Hursthouse’s intended validation of our beliefs in recourse to human nature can only take 
place from within this outlook, i.e. only in recourse to other such beliefs. Essentially, 
Hursthouse aims at evaluating our self-interpretation, which is constituted by our recognition 
of certain considerations as good reasons for action, in recourse to other reasons and 
considerations, which equally form part of this self-interpretation. Hence, her ethical 
naturalism, far from being reductive or scientistic, in fact represents a hermeneutical 
naturalism.5 (178-191; Hursthouse 2004, 273-275) 
 This raises the question whether such a way of proceeding is not viciously circular, 
since it ultimately aims at validating our acquired ethical outlook in recourse to itself. Given 
that this outlook is shaped by a particular, culturally and historically contingent tradition of 
self-interpretation, which we are inducted into in our upbringing, one might even wonder 
whether such a method of validation would not merely re-articulate our culture-specific 
prejudices, i.e. fail to make sufficient space for the possibility that our outlook might be 
wrong. Hursthouse confronts this worry by adopting Otto Neurath’s image of the ship the 
planks of which are exchanged gradually while at sea. In the same way, she argues, we can 
also evaluate any of our extant beliefs in terms of their coherence with the other parts of our 
outlook and, if necessary, replace them by and by. A Neurathian method of self-criticism thus 
allows us to make gradual changes to our outlook based on the reasons we have, and in a way 
that could potentially sum up to a complete change in outlook over time. Hence, on 
Hursthouse’s view, genuine critique does not require a foundation for our beliefs that would 
ground them in anything beyond our acquired ethical outlook itself, such as the findings of 
natural science, and this entails that their validation along coherentist lines would not be 
circular in any problematic sense. (165f., 240; Hursthouse 2004, 266) 
                                                          
4 Cf. Thompson (2004) and Hacker-Wright (2009) for comparable approaches.  
5 Rehg and Davis (2003) argue that, since Hursthouse does not embrace a scientistic concept of nature, her virtue 
ethics cannot count as genuinely naturalistic either. Yet, if ‘naturalism’ merely means the attempt at providing an 
explanation, validation, or justification in terms of nature, then it leaves open which concept of nature to employ. 
It seems that, in principle, nothing precludes a normative concept of nature from doing this work. Rehg and 
Davis deny this by pointing out structural analogies between Hursthouse’s normative concept of human nature 
and a decidedly non-naturalistic Neo-Kantian concept of normativity. One may wonder, however, whether Rehg 
and Davis sufficiently heed the differences between these views and whether they do not, from the outset, 
formulate their criteria for a genuinely naturalistic concept of nature with scientism firmly in mind. 
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 It is, however, not enough to point out the mere possibility of Neurathian self-
criticism. In order to avoid accusations of vagueness, Hursthouse intends to clarify how 
exactly such self-criticism is to proceed by specifying the standards or norms that rationally 
ought to guide it. That way, she ultimately hopes to illuminate our practices of ethical 
reasoning and justification, as they shape our ethical outlook and thus our understanding of 
human nature. (167, 194f.; Hursthouse 2004, 166f.) To accomplish this task, Hursthouse 
adopts Philippa Foot’s strategy of investigating the ethical use of the word ‘good’ in analogy 
to its non-ethical uses, in the belief that this contextualization will enable us to uncover the 
public criteria that govern it in such expressions as ‘good human being’ or ‘good reason’. 
(Hursthouse 2012, 175-177) 
 Like Foot, Hursthouse takes as her point of departure Peter Geach’s (1956) view that 
‘good’ functions as a logically attributive adjective, which receives its criteria of application 
from the noun or noun group it explicitly or implicitly is combined with. Hence, what is good 
in a knife differs from what is good in a pencil, and whether a mildewed cactus is good or bad 
depends on whether we consider it as an eccentric art project or simply as an exemplar of its 
kind. Foot and Hursthouse maintain that we employ ‘good’ consistently in this manner across 
various areas of evaluation, which is why the ethical evaluation of human beings and their 
reasons equally receives its criteria from the very concept of ‘the human’. Its standards are 
rooted in our species membership.6 (195-197; Foot 2001) 
 In light of this, Copp and Sobel (2004, 536) and Halbig (2015, 182f.) have raised the 
question why the ethical employment of ‘good’ should receive its criteria from our species 
concept rather than from other concepts, such as those of our genus, genotype, a local group 
membership, or (as one might add) that of the person. Yet, once we consider the actual criteria 
these concepts supply, it becomes apparent why they are unsuitable. Regarding the genus 
concept, John Lemos (2007, 54-56) has pointed out that being a good exemplar of a genus 
typically consists in being a good exemplar of one of the species it subsumes. Just as a chair 
only counts as a good piece of furniture when it is a good chair, so a lion only counts as a 
good exemplar of the genus ‘mammal’ when it is, in the first place, a good exemplar of the 
species of mammal it is. Moreover, Lemos argues that the formation of local groups and 
communities fulfills a function in human life, and for that reason the criteria of goodness 
connected to such group memberships ultimately derive from our species concept. Hursthouse 
(2012, 178) herself advances a similar argument when she characterizes personhood as part of 
                                                          
6 But note that critics such as Hare (1957), Pigden (1990), and Halbig (2015, 180-182) have questioned whether 
we do in fact employ ‘good’ consistently in a logically attributive manner. While I believe we do, on a proper 
understanding of logical attributiveness, I cannot argue the matter here for reasons of space. 
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our development as human beings and hence subject to the same criteria. She claims that the 
concept of person, taken by itself and understood abstractly as “self-conscious being”, is not 
rich enough in content to generate criteria of goodness that could capture our actual practice 
of ethical evaluation (206 fn. 20). On her view, the same applies to the concept of genotype 
and its associated criterion of gene replication (285). Apparently, then, there are reasons why 
Hursthouse and Foot focus their efforts on the species concept. 
 In parallel to Foot, Hursthouse does not approach the concept of ‘the human’ directly 
but first sets out to investigate the criteria of goodness contained in other biological species 
concepts, as these are employed, for instance, in botany and ethology. In doing so, it is not her 
intention to make any scientific claims about the subject matter of these disciplines but rather 
to describe the practices of evaluation in which these concepts figure. Underlying her 
approach is the assumption that biological species concepts generally stand in something like 
a family resemblance relationship, as far as the structures or forms of evaluation are 
concerned that they give rise to. By developing these resemblances in detail, Hursthouse aims 
at establishing an analogy between our own species concept and the concepts of plants and the 
other animals—an analogy between their respective criteria of goodness that, she hopes, will 
facilitate articulating the criteria that guide the ethical evaluation of humans. 
 Yet, compared to Foot’s account in Natural Goodness, the specific structures of 
evaluation that Hursthouse uncovers on her way up the scala naturae turn out markedly more 
complex. On her view, the overall evaluation of a living individual as a good or bad exemplar 
of its kind generally turns on whether certain aspects of that individual are such as to fulfill 
certain natural ends, which characterize the life of organisms of its kind. In the case of plants, 
for instance, we evaluate their body parts and vegetative processes in relation to individual 
survival and the continuance of their species. Transitioning to the lower animals, we find two 
further aspects capable of evaluation, namely a capacity for active behavior and an at least 
minimal psychology of affects and desires, which regulates this behavior. Since this 
psychology introduces a new form of benefit and harm that can accrue to the individuals that 
possess it, it also generates a further natural end in terms of which all four aspects can be 
evaluated. This third end consists in a species’ characteristic pleasure or enjoyment and 
freedom from pain. Finally, the life of the higher animals, which are social beings and live in 
groups or communities, additionally is characterized by a fourth end, namely the good 
functioning of the social group, which essentially consists in the conduciveness of group life 
to the other three ends. According to Hursthouse, these ends are interdependent in the life of 
individuals of a particular kind, which means that one should not evaluate the goodness of 
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their aspects in terms of any one natural end taken in isolation, but in respect of whether they 
allow for the joint realization of all natural ends pertaining to that species. Hence, in thus 
limiting each other in terms of what can count as conducive to their realization, these ends 
substantially constrain and determine what the characteristic, i.e. good endowment and way 
of life for a given species consists in. (197-205) 
 Human beings too are social animals. This suggests that the structure of evaluation 
generally associated with the concepts of such animals could also apply to our own species 
concept. On Hursthouse’s view, however, this is only partially the case because human beings 
essentially differ from other social animals in their rational capacity, which entails a structure 
of evaluation that diverges from theirs in crucial respects. On the one hand, our rational 
capacity introduces a fifth aspect in terms of which humans can be evaluated, in that it enables 
us to act for reasons and not merely, as the other animals, from inclination. (207) On the other 
hand, Hursthouse maintains that our rational capacity does not generate a fifth natural end, 
such as the life of theoretical contemplation or the preparation of the soul for the afterlife. On 
her view, our rational capacity does not merely add another dimension to the extant structure 
of evaluation but rather fundamentally transfigures the relation between our natural ends and 
the five aspects evaluated in terms of them. (217f.) 
 For non-rational living beings, what counts as the realization of their natural ends is 
more or less determinate by nature. That is, the goodness of their aspects takes on a definitive 
and largely identical shape in all individuals of the same kind, and hence enumerating the 
various parts and phases that make up a species’ characteristic endowment and way of life 
does not pose a significant problem. Human life, in contrast, is marked by enormous diversity, 
in light of which it is hopeless to try and compile, at least beyond certain commonplaces, 
anything aspiring to an objective list that would enumerate, for instance, what our 
characteristic enjoyments are or how we characteristically tend to our offspring. On 
Hursthouse’s view, this natural indeterminateness of human nature is due to our rational 
capacity. For whenever we are confronted with, for instance, a determinate way of living 
together in our social group, we can always question whether that way is well-founded or 
ought to be changed. We are thus capable of subjecting our way of life to criticism and can 
rationally modify those aspects we find wanting. Hence, the relation between the determinate 
shape of these aspects and our natural ends is, according to Hursthouse, essentially mediated 
by reasons. (218-222) 
 This transforms the character of the evaluation itself. The kind of evaluation non-
rational living beings are subject to is essentially one in terms of health. Yet, when the issue is 
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whether someone is a good or bad human being, the form of evaluation is an essentially 
ethical one and as such primarily concerned with the rationality of our practical self-
interpretation, and hence with the quality of our reasons. Correspondingly, given the singular 
and transformative importance of reason in human life, Hursthouse maintains that the overall 
evaluation of human beings as exemplars of their kind only takes account of those of their 
aspects that are ethically relevant, i.e. in principle open to be shaped by reason and choice. On 
her view, this expressly excludes the health of body parts and vegetative processes as 
irrelevant to overall evaluation and limits the pertinent aspects to actions performed from 
reasons, to our affects and desires, and to our occasional actions from inclination, insofar as 
these issue from our affective states. Since these aspects are open to rational cultivation, for 
instance in the course of upbringing, their determinate shape can be either rationally well-
founded or not and is hence open to ethical criticism. It is no accident, as Hursthouse notes, 
that the concept of virtue specifically captures the goodness of these aspects.7 (206-208) 
 Hence, the biological species concept of ‘the human’ is essentially that of a cultural 
being, which self-determines the specific shape of its form of life and does so in recourse to 
reasons: “Our characteristic way of going on, which distinguishes us from all the other 
animals, is a rational way. A ‘rational way’ is any way that we can rightly see as good, as 
something we have reason to do.” (222) According to Hursthouse, what we can rightly see as 
good is governed by the four natural ends that characterize social animals like us, for these 
provide the most general description of what human flourishing or eudaimonia consists in. In 
other words, the joint realization of these four ends determines the standard of practical 
rationality for human beings and thus represents the framework for evaluating the goodness of 
our reasons and ultimately the rationality of our practical self-interpretation. It seems then that 
Hursthouse has attained her goal of articulating normative guidelines for the Neurathian 
critique of our ethical outlook, which must underwrite any attempt at validating the reasons of 
virtue as actually and objectively good. (222-226) 
 Yet, this admittedly rather audacious proposal has prompted critics such as Copp and 
Sobel (2004, 540f.) and Halbig (2015, 191-194) to question the normative authority that the 
four ends allegedly exercise over practical reason. In case of non-rational living beings, the 
                                                          
7 Halbig (2015, 184-186) argues that the exclusion of health aspects from the overall evaluation of human beings 
represents a significant breach of continuity to other living beings, and that this seriously imperils the naturalistic 
character of ethical evaluation on Hursthouse’s account. It is important to note, however, that even among the 
other living beings there are significant differences regarding their aspects and natural ends. Clearly then, 
Hursthouse understands the continuity between the structures of evaluation that form part of different biological 
species concepts or natures not in terms of strict identity but rather in terms of family resemblance. Yet, speaking 
with McDowell, this allows for a ‘relaxed naturalism’ that is open to an essentially ethical form of evaluating 
living beings and a normative concept of human nature as essentially second nature. 
Penultimate draft. Please cite published version at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37576-8_12  
normative authority of their natural ends is underwritten by the causal (and perhaps ultimately 
evolutionary) necessity with which exemplars of a particular kind, provided nothing 
interferes, tend to grow into and maintain a quite determinate way of life, which serves the 
ends that characterize their species. Yet, as Hursthouse emphasizes herself, since human 
beings are practically rational animals, they are not subject to this kind of necessity. Rather, 
we are free to query any given arrangement of human life and to do things differently, if that 
is what we judge is right. On the critics’ view, this raises the question why then we should 
choose a way of life that satisfies the requirements of these ends in particular, instead of 
pursuing entirely different objectives. 
 One possible answer is provided by Julia Annas (2005, 17f.), who suggests that the 
authority of the four ends is based on some sort of causal necessity after all. On her view, 
Hursthouse understands these ends as a kind of biological barrier that practical reason is 
incapable of overcoming and therefore has to respect in fashioning a way of life for us. That 
is, human nature represents the material that our practical reason has to work on but cannot 
shape freely according to its wishes, because that material is recalcitrant. It is such as to limit 
the autonomy of practical reason in an essentially non-rational manner. Yet, as Annas’ (2005, 
25) own objections to such a view indicate, the four ends then no longer determine the 
standard of practical rationality, as they do not in any sense qualify our reasons. In order for 
them to be truly authoritative over practical reason, they must belong to its form, i.e. their 
authority must express not a causal but some sort of rational necessity. Yet, why should it be 
rationally necessary to pursue these four ends? As Halbig (2015, 191f.) observes, it is “simply 
not the case, neither descriptively nor normatively,” that humans necessarily have to intend 
these ends, since they—as McDowell (1995) notably emphasizes—are practically rational 
beings and as such capable of distancing themselves from any supposed natural teleology 
inscribed in their species. Whatever normative authority such ‘natural’ ends can claim over us 
is, on McDowell's view, neither necessary nor automatic but self-legislated, i.e. it can only 
result from our free and historically contingent choice to accept it.8 
 However, this objection ultimately rests on a misunderstanding of the role that 
Hursthouse assigns the four ends. To clarify this misunderstanding, it is helpful to look at how 
Hursthouse responds to another objection, which is connected to her view that the standard of 
practical rationality is determined by the joint realization of the four ends. For our nature as 
practically rational animals makes us capable of evaluating the various aspects of our self-
                                                          
8 Lott (2014) offers a systematic discussion of this objection as raised against neo-Aristotelian naturalism more 
generally. 
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interpretation not merely in relation to the four ends taken as a unity, but also in relation to 
any one of them in isolation from the others. This introduces the difficulty that, in contrast to 
other living beings, our natural ends can come apart and conflict in their requirements. (249-
251) What then guarantees that we can even develop a self-interpretation that satisfies all of 
them at once? On Hursthouse’s interpretation, this is precisely the question raised by Bernard 
Williams (1995, 109f.). According to Williams, the Darwinian refutation of natural teleology 
has revealed humans to be a chance product of evolution; a bricolage of randomly selected 
powers and instincts not organized according to any overarching purpose. It is therefore 
highly unlikely, he argues, that we are capable of ever bringing all of our needs and capacities 
into harmonious interplay. As the sorry course of human history demonstrates, on Williams’ 
view, there simply is no well-functioning way of life for human beings, and therefore true 
flourishing will forever remain impossible to us. (256-260) 
 It is decisive for Hursthouse’s reply that she does not regard the issue whether the four 
ends can in fact be harmonized as a matter of empirical discovery, but rather treats it as a 
question that needs to be settled within our ethical outlook. For that reason, she maintains that 
reference to the history of human life holds no real evidential value here because we cannot 
but read this history in light of our ethical beliefs concerning how human life generally works. 
Therefore, to read it as confirming the impossibility of human flourishing merely expresses a 
particularly pessimistic outlook on human life, which on Hursthouse’s view ultimately 
amounts to a global form of moral skepticism. If humans, as a matter of principle, can never 
attain their eudaimonia, no matter what they do, then there is no point in even trying, which 
entails that it no longer makes sense to act on reasons and therefore practical reason itself 
turns out irrelevant. Hence, belief in the possibility of harmonizing the four ends represents a 
necessary possibility condition of ethical thought as such, for otherwise the entire enterprise 
of thinking about what to do would not make sense. We may not be able to verify this belief 
from an ethically neutral, empirical point of view. Yet, we in fact affirm it performatively 
whenever we participate in the practice of ethical reasoning and actually develop a practical 
self-interpretation, which means: inescapably all the time. (260-265; Hursthouse 2012, 182-
184) 
 This is not merely true for the possibility of harmonizing the four ends, but also holds 
of these ends themselves. Thus, their normative authority does not rest on the claim that the 
realization of these ends in some sense of ‘necessary’ represents the ultimate object of our 
intentions, i.e. some kind of basic motivation from which all our other reasons are derived. On 
this ‘intentionalist’ reading, the four ends effectively act as some kind of ultimate practical 
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justification that provides us with a foundation for ascertaining the validity of the reasons of 
virtue, which then motivates us to acknowledge and actually follow them. Such a 
foundationalist approach sits badly with Hursthouse’s explicitly coherentist commitments. As 
she repeatedly emphasizes, the four ends are neither meant to provide us with ‘motivating 
reasons’, nor are they required to. For we already follow virtuous reasons as a matter of 
course in the context of our everyday praxis, which means, on her view, that their goodness is 
from the outset already more certain to us than any philosophical ‘ultimate’ justification we 
could give it. Thus, Hursthouse’s project of validating these reasons is not meant to create 
certainty where there was none, but rather to explain why we in fact treat such reasons as 
good.9 (170, 180, 194; Hursthouse 2002, 50-52) 
 Given that the four ends typically do not enter practical thought as objects of intention, 
they do not form part of the intentional finality of rational action. Rather, they represent what 
we may call its essential finality, i.e. rational action by its very nature is such as to realize or 
contribute to these ends, even though that is not what we intentionally aim at in following 
good reasons. Hence, the attainment of the four ends represents an unintended consequence of 
rational action, and this benefit in part defines what it means to act rationally because it 
ultimately explains in what sense good reasons—and particularly the reasons of virtue—are 
good and carry a certain weight.  
 This attribution of an essential finality to rational action does not imply, however, that 
Hursthouse attempts to ground the normative authority of the four ends in some natural 
teleology allegedly inscribed in our species or its biology. Nor is she trying to derive such a 
teleology from an investigation of other living beings, with the aim of applying or imposing 
the results on our practice of ethical thought ‘from the outside’. Rather, Hursthouse aims at 
explicating and articulating the general structure or form of ethical thought as it is manifest in 
our first-personal practice of it, i.e. ‘from the inside’. That is, the ‘teleology’ or finality she 
attributes to practically rational action is not external but in fact internal to and constitutive of 
it, even though it is not intentional in form. The chief difficulty here resides in how to make 
sense of a finality that is internal to practical thought, i.e. somehow understood in it, yet not 
intentional, i.e. not constituted by any explicit thought about ends, means, or specifications of 
                                                          
9 A variant of the foundationalist picture also underlies Gowans’ (2008) charge that a “straightforward 
application of the Teleological Criterion” (52) allegedly formed by the four ends will not yield anything 
resembling our morality, and that in particular moral universalism cannot be derived from it. That is, Gowans 
treats the four ends as a criterion that we can apply to test ethical beliefs directly. Yet, this is not Hursthouse’s 
intent. Although the four ends are meant to guide ethical thought and argument somehow, they are not meant to 
effectively replace it with a quasi-technical decision procedure of this kind. 
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ends.10 As a means of investigating this special kind of finality, Hursthouse’s analogy to other 
biological species concepts does not play a foundational or grounding role but merely serves 
as an auxiliary to explication. 
 In the end, both the natural-teleological and the intentionalist readings of her project 
overlook that Hursthouse (16) herself attributes an essentially Wittgensteinian character to it. 
If interpreted in this light, her actual view seems to be that the four ends represent necessary 
possibility conditions of ethical thought as such in that they constitute the basic context or 
horizon that renders ethical reasoning intelligible to us; a context that is implicitly understood 
whenever we reason about what to do. Put differently, these ends provide the basic framework 
for understanding the very meaning and point of ethical claims and thereby act as 
intelligibility conditions of any ethical argument. This is why, whenever we engage in such 
argument, these ends qualify our reasons with rational necessity. In Wittgenstein’s 
terminology, they represent ‘hinge propositions’ that form part of a description of the logical 
grammar that in fact governs the language game we call ‘ethical reasoning’.11 (265; 
Hursthouse 2002, 51-53)  
 On this account, the normative authority of the four ends is underwritten by the fact 
that they are constitutive of the very form of ethical thought, and consequently of the form or 
nature of human practical reason itself.12 Thus, when Hursthouse states that our evaluation of 
the reasons of virtue is subject to a “mixture of constraints imposed by nature and the ethical 
outlook” (229), she does not imply that the autonomy of reason is limited by something 
external to it. Rather, she makes the point that our material conception of good reasons, 
which represents our ethical outlook and as such is formed by tradition and handed down to 
us in upbringing, is itself constrained by certain formal norms of reason in the guise of the 
four ends. Hence, on Hursthouse’s view, the form according to which practical reason 
necessarily proceeds in its self-legislation is not, for instance, that of the categorical 
imperative. Rather, it essentially relates to our very humanity. 
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